Was there a new award decision after the first overpayment period had expired which fell within the second overpayment period? If so then the first overpayment decision should have been revised or superseded and the new award decision also superseded and, as Mike and Tony have said, a new overpayment decision issued to the claimant with fresh appeal papers.
The appeal bundle then should cover the whole overpayment period showing that all award decisions had been correctly revised or superseded.
If not then the first overpayment decision should still have been revised or superseded and a new overpayment decision issued to the claimant.
The only other alternative (which does not make either judicial or administrative sense) would be to issue a separate overpayment decision for the second period with a separate right of appeal, two sets of appeal papers and two separate hearings.
As said above the DWP cannot just revise or supersede an outcome decision without notifying it to the claimant because until notified to the claimant in proper form then the decision is of no effect.
If the case goes to tribunal as it is the claimant should submit to the tribunal that it has no jurisdiction over the second overpayment because the decision to recover has no legal force until notified to the claimant.
In Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another (Respondents) ex parte Anufrijeva (FC) (Appellant)
Lord Steyn stated at paragraph 27: -
"The arguments for the Home Secretary ignore fundamental principles of our law. Notice of a decision is required before it can have the character of a determination with legal effect because the individual concerned must be in a position to challenge the decision in the courts if he or she wishes to do so. This is not a technical rule. It is simply an application of the right of access to justice. That is a fundamental and constitutional principle of our legal system: Raymond v Honey <1983> 1 AC 1, 10G per Lord Wilberforce; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Leech, <1994> QB 198, 209D; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Simms <2000> 2 AC 115".
And at paragraph 28: -
"This view (in paragraph 26 above and expanded by paragraph 27 of the judgement - my insert) is reinforced by the constitutional principle requiring the rule of law to be observed. That principle too requires that a constitutional state must accord to individuals the right to know of a decision before their rights can be adversely affected. The antithesis of such a state was described by Kafka: a state where the rights of individuals are overridden by hole in the corner decisions or knocks on doors in the early hours. That is not our system. I accept, of course, that there must be exceptions to this approach, notably in the criminal field, e.g. arrests and search warrants, where notification is not possible. But it is difficult to visualise a rational argument which could even arguably justify putting the present case in the exceptional category. If this analysis is right, it also engages the principle of construction explained by Lord Hoffmann in Simms".
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