thanks paul : )
i fully endorse what you and Derek have said on this so far. i don't think one size fits all, and i'd like to see a special case argument (because it's huge and working) made for SSATs...: )
to respond to the article 6 points you raised, hoping it is some help, i think the issues are around point 2 - the judicial process. my thinking on this is fairly simplistic, and i'll try to set it out a simply as possible.
first of all, i have at the back of my mind, that article 6 has been ruled not to kick in at the stage of first tier decision-making, but this is ok because there is a right of appeal, to which article 6 applies...!!!!!
next, the problem that i see with an ombudsman-style adjudication is that this has conventionally been concerned with the question of maladministration, a quuite distinct area of remedy to the appeal system. adjudication of individual cases has been outside the jurisdiction of ombudsmen, who as you say, try to find compromises, and also consider the _reasonableness_ of the authority's actions. i'm not convinced that this would provide the equality of arms that point 1 requires, and which is inherent in (2)-a fair judicial process. the judicial process considers the facts and the law, and the administrative process by which the law is applied to the facts of the individual case, is a mere mechanism of delivery, which is not given any _automatic_ advantage over the claimant. it is a tool, a means to achieve the outcome that the law has provided for, and in law, it has no higher status than that.
the judicial process takes account of the needs of the tool, to the extent that it is required to by statutory provision, _and_ in it's exercise of judgement, which we can assume is reasoned and wise (compassionate). the OSA takes account of the needs of the authority overall, at a step removed from the starting point of the tribunal process - the facts of the individual case, and the law - it considers whether the authority acted reasonably. an authority can be found to have acted reasonably, if you take account of its needs, even when a wrong outcome decision is made.
an example of what i mean can be found on the disability forum - see the thread started by Carol Obeine. what you have there is decision-making which is general and abstract, not particular - formulaic decision-making, which would suit the statutory authority's administrative needs, because formulaic decision-making can be systematised and computerised, and it would love (for cheapness's sake) to get away from individual decision-making. a complaint about that decision to an OSA body could very well result in a finding that the authority made a reasonable decision, whereas a tribunal finding could be quite different, because the adjudication relates to the particulars of an individual case. this is an extremely important principle, imo, and crucial to article 6.
to go further, i would be extremely concerned if the alternative dispute resolution is conducted in the language (on the terms of) the statutory authority.
commisioners have commented, for example, on the language used by local authorities in 'closing down' HB claims, or 'setting to dead' - administrative terms which have no basis in the law, administered by the authorities. i see this as very important. i am realistic enough to accept that the technical jargonese of administating authorities will evolve on a day to day basis. but there is a danger in this that it creates concepts which have no legal force. (just today i saw a case where a _compliment slip_ told a claimant that his IB claim could not be determined until his wife's JSA claim was 'closed down' - wrong!) the appeal writing stage is now often the first stage at which the facts of the case are grappled with in a different language from the internal day to day language of the administering authority- the language of the law, and plain unadulterated English. it's at this stage, due to the discipline of language and logic (as opposed to jargonese and procedure) that the realisation often comes home that the decision cannot be sustained, and must be revised.
imo, the importance of this will become more critical, as the current changes ( increased remoteness from the claimant, increased reliance on procedures, decreased training in SS law) take effect.
an alternative dispute resolution, or OSA which does not entail reference to the law in the _language_ of the law, and the consideration of the law, and which does not entail application of the law to the individual circumstances of the particular case, rather than on formulaic bases, must compromise Article 6? I cannot see how an alternative dispute resoltion which meets the requirements of article 6, is anything but a tribunal under a different name, begging the question, what is the point?
the point about justice being seen to be done is also a very important point. it's worth reminding ourselves that the NI system was set up in 1948 with a good deal of care, to create an independent statutory authority, with a right of appeal. the old national assistance board, then the supplementary benefit commission, involved discretion which was eventually adjudged to be unfair, and the means-testing system was eventually regulated, with an appeal system in line with contributory benefits, in 1980, for reasons of fairness which were considered compelling at the time. (Mrs. Thatcher's time - I assume the ball was rolling unstoppably before then - I can't remember, just as the SS Act 1998 was set in motion before its enactment by the current government, which i do remember!!). it is difficult to see, given the ever-increasing complexity, and predominance of means-testing, any convincing argument for moving away from that position.
the independence of the first tier decision-makers has already been removed and given into the hands of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State must be aware that moves to diminish access to an independent tribunal hearing, even on the grounds of cost, will be, and will be seento be, abusive of power?
jan
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